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The salinity problem in United States rivers becomes worse each year,
and no water law system to date has been developed that adequately addresses
salinity management. Professor Johnson discusses the salinity problem and its
scope as well as remedial and preventative measures that have been taken in
the past. He suggests combating the salinity problem by use of systems analysis, i.e., a comprehensive basinwide or regional management plan that analyzes the entire hydrological, economic, political, and agricultural system.

OUR SALTY RIVERS: LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO
SALINITY MANAGEMENTt
Ralph W. Johnson*
The salinity problem in United States rivers and elsewhere
worsens year by year. Not considered serious prior to World
War II, especially in the United States, this problem now demands attention worldwide because the cumulative impact of
irrigation and other water uses is raising salinity to damaging
levels.
No water law system developed in the United States to
date adequately addresses salinity management. The prior appropriation system of the west and the riparian system of the
east both evolved from different needs and left to the future
the largely unforeseen question of salinity control. Water
pollution control programs created by states prior to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 attacked point-source pollution rather than the subtle and perCopyrightC 1978 by Marcel Dekker, Inc.
tProfessor Johnson's article is adapted from a chapter he has authored which will
appear in Yaron, Salinity, Irrigation and Water Resources. This book, which is currently in press, is published by Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York, New York. The pub
publisher has granted the Land and Water Law Review permission to reproduce
this article.

*Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.S., 1947, University of Oregon;
LL.B., 1949, University of Oregon; member of the Oregon and Washington Bars.
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vasive non-point salinity pollution. Federal water projects,
built largely since 1900 by the Bureau of Reclamation and
other federal agencies, have not, either in design or legal
structure, anticipated salinity problems.
We must now look for new legal and institutional approaches for managing salinity. Because the sources of salinity are so widely scattered and diffused and have an impact on
interstate as well as international rivers,, effective solutions
must be regional, national or even international in scope and
the federal gbvernment must necessarily be involved in their
design.
There are no simple legal or institutional solutions to salinity problems. They generally occur in basins that are hydrologically and legally highly developed, where farming and
industrial investments are well established, where vested interests are aggressively protected, and where cultural attitudes
are firmly fixed. The onset of damaging levels of salinity is
ordinarily gradual, the cumulative result of thousands of
small individual farming and reservoir operations. Solutions
are even more difficult here than for the normal industrial
and municipal pollution problems where sources can be located, identified, tested and monitored. Agricultural salinity
comes from diffused, non-point sources which makes it technologically difficult as well as economically impractical to
test, monitor and establish controls for individual sources.
The legal and institutional approaches to pollution control that work elsewhere are considerably less effective in
controlling these non-point salinity sources. The special relationship of the land, water, population, crop distribution,
and legal systems that exists in each basin means that solutions must often be uniquely tailored to meet each problem.
Finding principles of general applicability is especially difficult. However, we believe that some general principles do
exist, and they can best be examined and illustrated through
a case study of the agricultural salinity problems in a particular basin. This brings us to the Colorado River Basin,
and suggests that a careful analysis of the legal-institutional
approach to the salinity problems there might be of unique
value because information has been published and the remedial actions are visible. At the end of this study we shall note
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss2/4
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the applicability of some of the concepts used in the Colorado
Basin to other river basins and especially to basins in the developing part of the world.
The Colorado is one of the larger rivers of the world that
has been both substantially appropriated and subjected to extensive legal and institutional actions to control salinity.
Aside from the salinity controls, the Colorado long has been
subjected to intensive legal control primarily concerned
with water quantity allocation. Some understanding of this
legal background is essential in order to understand the complexities involved in designing salinity control remedies. A
full discussion of the so-called "law of the river" for the
Colorado fills many volumes.' We will give only the barest
summary here.
The seven states2 in the Basin all apply the prior appropriation doctrine which holds that water users who are "first
in time are first in right". California also applies the riparian
system. Nearly all the streamflows within the basin have been
appropriated under these water law systems. Groundwater
withdrawals within the basin are not so extensively controlled, different states having adopted one or a combination
of some four legal systems applicable to such waters including:
1) the rule of correlative rights,
2) the rule of reasonableness,
3) the rule of absolute ownership, and
4) the rule of prior appropriation.
Statutory groundwater codes, although adopted more widely
in recent years, tend to be far less comprehensive than surface water laws.
The Colorado River Compact of 1922 (which became effective in 1929) apportioned beneficial uses of 7.5 million
1.

CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (1967); Trelease, Arizona v. California,Al-

location of Water Resources to People, States, and Nations, 1963 SUP. CT. REV.
158; HUTCHINS,

WATER

RIGHTS

LAWS

IN THE NINETEEN

WESTERN STATES,

(1974); FARNHAM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS (1904); Meyers, The Colorado
River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966). A brief statement of the law of the river for the
Colorado can be found in NATIONAL ACADEMY
CHOICE IN THE COLORADO BASIN (1968).

2.

OF SCIENCES,

WATER

AND

Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming.
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acre feet to the Upper Basin and 7.5 million acre feet (maf)
to the Lower Basin. The Boulder Canyon Project Act of
1928, combined with certain California state legislation limited California's consumptive use to no more than 4.4 maf
per year of the total 7.5 maf allocated to the Lower Basin
states plus not more than half the surplus. 3 The Boulder Canyon Project Act also authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to enter into contracts, which he has subsequently done, to
deliver 2.8 maf consumptive use to Arizona and 300,000 acre
feet to Nevada. The Supreme Court's 1964 decree, implementing its 1963 decision in Arizona v. California,4 interpreted the Boulder Canyon Project Act to mean that it apportioned only the waters of the mainstream, not including
diversions from tributaries such as the Gila River in Arizona.
Later, the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 gave
California's 4.4 maf per year priority over the Central Arizona
Project. Thus, the Colorado River Compact, the Boulder
Canyon Project Act, the Supreme Court decree in Arizona v.
California, and the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act all
combine to apportion the water supplies among the Lower
Basin States.
The 1963 decision in Arizona v. California also held that
in the event of a shortage the Secretary of the Interior had
discretionary power to allocate that shortage among the Lower Basin States, and even within the states after satisfaction
of certain rights antedating 1929. In 1948 the Upper Basin
States agreed to an apportionment of their share of Colorado
River water in a compact that gave 51.75% of total beneficial
3.

4.

A more complete statement of this allocation is as follows:
According to Articles III(a) and 111(b) of the compact, each basin was allocated 7,500,000 acre-feet and the lower basin was given permission to
increase its uses by an additional 1,000,000 acre-feet. But neither of
these allocations was guaranteed. They merely indicated how the water
would be divided if it were available. There was another provision of the
compact, however, which, for all practical purposes, does seem to represent a guarantee. Article III(d) stipulates that the upper basin "will not
cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet for any period of 10 consecutive years."
This would essentially mean an annual delivery of 7,500,000 acre-feet.
Presently, the upper basin contributes about 13,700,000 acre-feet annually to the mainstream. Consequently, to fulfill its compact obligation,
it must limit its consumptive uses to 6,200,000 acre-feet, some 1,300,000
acre-feet less than anticipated. Indeed, it may have to curtail its uses even
more in order to satisfy its share of the Mexican burden if return flow
should eventually prove unacceptable under the treaty, and if it should
be determined that the 75,000,000 acre-feet does not include its contribution to Mexico.
HUNDLEY, DrvmnG THE WATERS, 181-182 (1966).
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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use to Colorado, 11.25% to New Mexico, 23% to Utah, 14%
to Wyoming, and 50,000 acre feet per year to Arizona which
has a small part of the Upper Basin within its borders.
In 1944 the United States and Mexico entered a treaty
which guaranteed Mexico 1.5 maf to be increased in years of
surplus to 1.7 and reduced in years of extraordinary drought
in proportion to the reduction of consumptive uses in the
United States. This treaty has been supplemented by three
agreements embodied in the minutes of the International
Boundary and Water Commission and created by the 1944
Treaty. These minutes were designed to provide a solution to
the problem of increasing salinity of the water flowing in the
Colorado across the border from the United States into Mexico.
Why does the salinity problem arise now? Several reasons
combined to bring this problem to the fore in the 1960's.
The level of salinity of the river had been increasing gradually
ever since the first irrigation projects were built. However,
prior to 1961 there were no major problems because the salinity of the water delivered to Mexico was generally within
100 parts per million (ppm) of the water on the United States
side at Imperial Dam. In 1961 the United States commenced
operation of a series of drainage wells as part of the WelltonMohawk project 5 and these wells discharged highly saline water into the Colorado below the last United States diversion
point but above the Mexican diversion, raising the salinity of
the Colorado River water flowing to Mexico from an average
of about 800 ppm in 1960 to 1500 ppm in 1962. At about
the same time the total flow of water reaching Mexico was
sharply reduced by the United States as water was held back
to fill the reservoir behind Glen Canyon Dam.6 This exacerbated the salinity problem. Mexico objected strenuously to
these actions.
After the winter of 1961-62 the United States took provisional measures to minimize the impact of the high salinity
drainage from the Wellton-Mohawk project. At the same time
5.
6.

Gila Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 613-613e (1970).
This loss of dilution water can be emphasized by two figures: for the 10-year period
from 1951 to 1960 the average delivery to Mexico at the Northerly International
Boundary was 4.2 maf/yr., while for the succeeding 10-year period from 1961 to
1970, the flow averaged only 1.5 maf/yr.
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the United States entered negotiations with Mexico to arrive
at a longer term solution and reconstituted the Committee of
Fourteen representing the Basin states to advise the Secretary
7
of State in connection with the salinity problem.
In 1965 the two governments reached a five-year agreement set out in Minute 218 of the International Boundary
and Water Commission. According to this Minute, the United
States agreed to three actions: (1) to construct an extension
of the Wellton-Mohawk Drain so that these highly saline waters could, at times chosen by Mexico, be carried directly
into the Gulf of Mexico rather than into the Colorado above
the Mexican diversion points; (2) to engage in selective pumping of wells in the Wellton-Mohawk Project to alleviate salinity at times most critical to Mexico; and (3) to release about
50,000 acre feet per year from behind Imperial Dam to replace the water flushed down the Wellton-Mohawk drain extension into the Gulf of California.
These actions, which cost the United States about eleven
million dollars, reduced the average annual salinity of waters
delivered to Mexico from 1500 ppm in 1962 to 1245 ppm in
late 1971. Mexico also took certain unilateral action during
this period which further reduced the average salinity to
about 1160 ppm.
The above actions were not considered a permanent solution to the problem and negotiations continued throughout
1971 and 1972 toward such a permanent solution. Meantime
Minute 218 was extended for a year, until November 1971. A
new, temporary agreement, embodied in Minute 241, was
reached in July 1972 to run only until December 31, 1972
and this was estimated to result in a reduction in salinity of
about one hundred parts per million from 1242 in 1971 to
1140 in 1973. In addition, Mexico requested the United
States to bypass the balance of the drainage, about 100,000
acre feet annually, from the Wellton-Mohawk Project so the
water would be carried directly to the Gulf of California.
This water counted against the Mexican entitlement of 1.5
maf. However, it further reduced the salinity of Colorado
River waters delivered to Mexico to slightly below 1000 ppm.
7.

Holburt, InternationalProblems of the ColoradoRiver, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 11,

14(1975).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss2/4
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During the negotiations when the United States and Mexico were trying to work out a permanent agreement, consideration was given to presenting the issue to the International
Court of Justice, or to a special arbitral tribunal convened for
this purpose. However, both sides preferred a bilateral, negotiated settlement, and that is what occurred.
The main issue dividing the two countries was "the difference in quality between the water available to United States
users below Imperial Dam (about 850 ppm for most) and the
water delivered to Mexico at the northerly international
boundary, in compliance with the Water Treaty (then averaging about 1140 ppm under the operation of Minute 241)".8
These and certain subsidiary issues were finally set aside in
favor of an agreed overall objective, i.e., to deliver to Mexico
water of a quality suitable for agricultural purposes. More
specifically, the agreement reached was to deliver water to
Mexico at Morelos Dam of a quality that is 115 ppm plus or
minus 30 ppm greater than the average annual salinity of the
water arriving at Imperial Dam.
While these negotiations were going on the United States
was becoming increasingly aware of its own salinity problem
and that, without reference to Mexican claims, action would
have to be taken to protect water users on the Lower Colorado in the United States from excessive salinity. This concern had initially surfaced several years before, in the 1950's,
resulting in the authorization of studies of the salinity problem in the 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act and
subsequent legislation on major projects in the Upper Basin.
The active program of the Colorado Basin States began
about the time9 of the publication of the Colorado River
8.
9.

Brownell & Eaton, The Colorado River Salinity Problem with Mexico, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 255, 259 (1975).
John T. Maletic, Chief, Water Quality Office, Engineering and Research Center,
Bureau of Reclamation, says:
It is difficult to pinpoint the initiation of the "active program." The historic trace of studies done by other agencies goes back many years. The
Environmental Protection Agency and its predecessor agencies have
worked on the problem for 8 years - covering most of the decade of the
60s. Also, various aspects of the salinity conditions were studied by the
U.S. Geological Survey and the Bureau of Reclamation. I believe that
meetings between the basin state representatives and Interior Department officials in 1971 just prior to the enforcement conference were instrumental in establishing the active salinity control program within the
Bureau entitled "The Colorado River Water Quality Improvement Program.",

Letter from J. T. Maletic to Ralph W. Johnson (Nov. 25. 1975).
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Board of California Report "Need for Controlling Salinity of
the Colorado River" in August, 1970. In 1971 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released an eight-year study
entitled "The Mineral Quality Problem in the Colorado River
Basin". Projections were made of salinity levels at four key
locations on the Lower Colorado River for unlimited and
limited development conditions.
The EPA projections are summarized below in miligrams
per liter (mg/i): 0
Limited
Unlimited
Development
Development
1960 1980 2010 1970 1980&2010
(base)
800
697 876 990 760
Hoover Dam
800
684 866 985 760
Parker Dam
850
713 940 1082 800
Palo Verde Dam
920
865
1223
1056
759
Imperial Dam
The EPA defined limited development as completion of
all currently authorized projects, with no new developments.
The projections of other agencies differ numerically but they
all show the same trend."
At Imperial Dam
(in mg/i)
2000 2(030
1990
S0
198
Year
9(
California Colorado River Board 9E 0 1080 1210
30 1115 1169
US Bureau of Reclamation
1290 1 350
12( 0 Water Resources Council
In a subsequent July 1974' study, 2 a special Department
of the Interior study team analyzed the impact on water use
that is projected to result from energy development in the
Upper Colorado Basin till the year 2000. The report states:
Salt loading due to energy development will be insignificant in comparison to the concentrating effects of
10. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE MINERAL QUALITY PROB11.
12.

LEM IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN at 21 (1971). [hereinafter cited as EPA Report].
U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER WATER
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM at 9 (1972). The figures for Bureau of Reclamation estimates were provided by J. T. Maletic (Nov. 25, 1975).
U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON WATER FOR ENERGY IN THE UPPER
COLORADO RIVER BASIN at 56 (1974).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss2/4
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the consumptive use projected for these [energy] developments with the possible exception of salt leaching from spent disposal piles [the relative impact of
each development is dependent upon a number of
variables; comprehensive studies have not yet been
made]. However, as an example, it has been estimated that a shale production of 1 million barrels per day
would result in an increased salinity concentration of
9 mg/1 at Imperial Dam if surface water were the sole
source and there were no return flows.
This energy study will result in changes in the 1972 projections contained in the earlier Bureau study on anticipated salinity levels in the Colorado, although the exact amounts of
the changes have not yet been published. Obviously, many
variables are involved in any such projections, and one especially important variable is the existence of the energy crisis
which began after 1972, and which has resulted in a national
policy designed to make the United States increasingly independent of Mideast oil sources. The continuation of the energy shortage, and the policy of national energy independence
could well accelerate the development of energy sources in
the Upper Colorado Basin and exacerbate the salinity problem.
In view of the projected increases in salinity, even in
1971, the EPA recognized the need for action." The Report
recognized that implementation of a basinwide salinity control program based on salt-load reductions would face several
legal and institutional constraints. Some of these would be
imposed by existing state water laws, 4 although there is no
evidence that these particular constraints posed any major
roadblocks for the salinity control program.
Improvement of water transportation and irrigation efficiency with consequent reductions in water use and return
flows raises other possible conflicts with state water rights
laws.
13.

14.

Earlier, in 1968, a cooperative salinity control program for the Colorado River
Basin was proposed by the Director, Pacific Southwest Region, Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, and the Chief Engineer, Bureau of Reclamation.
The proposed program, however, was caught in the change of administration and,
as a result, was not put into effect until the above-mentioned meetings were held
between the states and Interior Department officials. Letter from J. T. Maletic to
Ralph W. Johnson (Nov. 25, 1975).
EPA Report, supra note 10, at 53.
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The EPA report noted the lack of any overall planning
and implementation entity for the basin. Specifically, the report provides:
An important institutional factor for consideration is
the lack of a single entity with basinwide jurisdiction
to direct and implement a salinity control program.
In addition, water quality and water quantity considerations are generally under the jurisdiction of different agencies at both the state and federal levels. This
split in jurisdiction poses coordination problems to
all interests affected by a salinity control program.15
Other authors have also regretted the lack of existence of a
comprehensive management entity for the basin. "Most
forms of salinity require the creation of a regional agency to
administer them." 1 6 "A regional agency may provide water
quality management for the basin, or it may provide river
basin management in all respects including water quality." ' 7
The EPA study identified two pre-existing objectives that
it concluded should not be altered by the salinity control
program: (1) full development of the water supply allocated
to each state by applicable water laws and compacts, and (2)
expansion of the regional economy. 18 Beyond this the study
recommended the prompt setting of numerical salinity limits
in the water quality standards for the Colorado, the creation
of a single institutional entity with basinwide jurisdiction responsible for both planning and implementing a control program, legislative authorization and funding of salinity control
projects, a systems analysis using "a refined water quality
similation model and updated economic evaluation" 19 to
evaluate the quality and economic aspects of the problem
and alternative solutions, and additional research on salinity
control technology.
One basic, underlying attitude held uniformly by the
Colorado Basin states was that salinity control for the benefit
of Mexico should be considered a national (not a regional) re15. Id. at 55.
16.

Gindler & Holburt, Water Salinity Problems: Approaches to Legal and Engineering
Solution, 9 NAT. RESOURCES J. 329, 400 (1969).

17. Id. at 343.
18.

EPA Report, supra note 10, at 57.

19. Id. at 62.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss2/4
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sponsibility and financial obligation.20 Indeed, this philosophy
has been implemented in congressional action, discussed below.
The EPA study provided the basis for a major conference,
held in Las Vegas, February 1972, and concluded in Denver
in April, 1972. The topic of the conference was "In the Matter of Pollution of the Interstate Waters of the Colorado River and its Tributaries" and the meetings provided important
background information for consideration by the negotiators
of Minute 242, with Mexico, setting forth the final settlement on the international salinity problem.
During the period of negotiations toward Minute 242, the
United States was under considerable pressure to provide a
permanent supply of water to Mexico with acceptable salinity
values. At the same time it was under pressure from a strong
coalition of the seven Basin states to adopt a solution that (1)
imposed no costs on them for salinity control remedies, and
(2) included federally financed solutions to their own intraUnited States salinity problems. Although the final agreement
and 1974 implementing legislation is very favorable to the
Basin states, they nonetheless objected to the fact that they
were not more directly included in the decisionmaking process
with Mexico 21 and that some of their arguments were "ignored., 2 2
In 1974 Congress enacted Public Law 93-320, the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to build and modify various projects. in
the Basin for the protection of both United States and Mexican water quality. Title I of the Act establishes a program for
improving the quality of the water reaching Mexico. The
costs of this program are totally non-reihnbursable and are to
be borne by the United States as a national obligation. Title
II of the Act provides salinity control for the benefit of the
Colorado River Basin States. The costs for this part of the
20.
21.
22.

For an analysis of the Regional Coalitions that powered this attitude, see Mann,
Politics in the United States and the Salinity Problem of the Colorado River, 15
NAT. RESOURCES J. 113,127 (1975).
Dregne, Salinity Aspects of the Colorado River, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 43, 51
(1975).
Gostin, Outline History of Colorado River Dvelopment at 50 (Feb. 28, 1974).
(Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science).
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program are split; seventy-five per cent are to be paid by the
federal government and are to be non-reimbursable in view of
the federal responsibility for an interstate stream and international comity with Mexico and because of federal ownership
of federal lands which contribute heavily to the salinity problem. The other twenty-five per cent of the costs are to be
paid from the sale of hydro-electric-power (generated by the
federal power system in the Basin) to users within and outside the Basin.
The final international agreement and the congressional
legislation implementing that agreement can be summarized
as follows: 23 construction of a 120 million gallon per day desalting complex for treatment of the heavily saline draw-water from the Wellton-Mohawk Project with all costs nonreimbursable; acceleration of a program to improve irrigation efficiency on the Wellton-Mohawk Project, with the district
bearing part of the cost; and acquisition by the Secretary of
the Interior of an initial 10,000 acres of the 75,000 acres in
the Project for the purpose of reducing return flows, to be
paid for by a reduction in repayment obligation for the Project and an offset for any increased operating costs. They also
provide for acquisition of additional lands above Painted
Rock Dam for temporary flood storage; construction of a
new canal or lining of the Coachella Canal for a length of
forty -nine miles for the purpose of conserving water presently lost to seepage with the cost of this construction to be repaid by the Coachella Valley County Water District in forty
years except that the payment period would not begin for
several years. Also, the Secretary of the Interior is to construct and operate a well field near the Mexican border, the
water of which is to be delivered to Mexico under the Treaty
obligation, with the cost of the well field non-reimbursable.
The construction of four salinity control projects is authorized
at (1) Paradox Valley, Colorado, (2) The Grand Valley Basin,
Colorado, (3) Crystal Geyser, Utah, and (4) Las Vegas Wash,
Nevada, along with various other salinity control projects.
Authorization of investigation of twelve other sources of salinity, and the creation of a Colorado River Basin Salinity
Control Advisory Council composed of representatives of
23.

For a more complete description of these documents, see Mann, supra note 20, at

123-25.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss2/4
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each basin state to advise on the salinity control program are
also provided for in the final international agreement and implementing legislation.
It is appropriate to note here that one additional solution considered, and rejected, at least for the present, was the
augmentation of the Colorado by importing water from
either Northern California rivers, or the Columbia River in
the Pacific Northwest. These alternatives would bring into
the Colorado from 1.7 to 5.9 million acre feet annually with
resulting reductions in annual salinity concentrations at
Hoover Dam ranging from 100 to 300 miligrams per liter.
However, the flow augmentation proposals were estimated to
be more costly per unit of salinity reduction than other solutions. These solutions would also take longer to implement
and would raise many issues not related to the salinity problem, not the least of which is the continuing hostility of both
areas of origin, California and the Pacific Northwest States,
to any such proposals.
One of the concerns of EPA has been to assure that numerical quality standards on allowable concentrations of salinity are adopted in the Basin (although the overall objective
of maintaining salinity below 1972 levels was adopted at the
1972 enforcement conference). Thus, on December 18,1974,
acting under authority of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 the EPA issued regulations24
requiring the states in the Basin to adopt water quality standards for salinity, consisting of minimum salinity criteria and
a plan of implementation for salinity control. The standards
were to be submitted to EPA for approval on or before October 18, 1975, and are to treat the salinity problem as a basinwide problem. The goal continues to be to maintain Lower
Colorado River "salinity at or below 1972 levels while the
Basin states continue to develop their compact apportioned
waters." 2 5
The seven Basin states are utilizing the Colorado River
Basin Salinity Control Forum as a voluntary interstate planning entity for drawing up standards and plans of implemen24.
25.

40 C.F.R. §§ 120 et seq. (1976).
40 C.F.R. § 120.5(b) (1976).
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tation. The Forum has indicated2 that it will adopt numeric
criteria at key locations on the Colorado as follows:
Below Hoover Dam
Below Parker Dam
Imperial Dam

723 mg/1
747 mg/1
879 mg/1

The plan of implementation being considered by the
Basin states is essentially to accept what the federal government proposes to do in the Colorado River Salinity Control
Act of 1974,27 i.e., the states plan to take only modest action
on their own. Thus, the Forum's plan will (1) urge prompt
construction and operation of the initial four units authorized
by the federal act (federal action), (2) urge construction of
the twelve other units listed in that Act after receipt of favorable planning reports (federal action), (3) recommend the
placing of stringent effluent limitations on new industry (the
states have agreed on a "no salt return concept" for new
power and industrial installations) (state action), 28 and (4)
recommend the reformulation of previously authorized but
unconstructed, water projects to reduce salt loading affect
(state action). The plan recommends further state action in
urging the use of saline water for industrial purposes whenever practical, programs by water users to cope with the river's high salinity, improvements in irrigation systems and
management to reduce salt pickup studies of means to minimize salinity in municipal discharges, and studies of future
possible salinity control programs.29
The plan does not recommend mandatory controls on irrigation or land use.80 According to one state official, 1 any
26.

COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL FORUM, PROPOSED WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR SALINITY INCLUDING NUMERIC CRITERIA AND PLAN OF
IMPLEMENTATION FOR SALINITY CONTROL: COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM at i

(1975).

Letter from Joseph C. Lord, Interstate Streams Engineer, State of Wyoming to
Ralph W. Johnson (Apr. 16, 1975); Letter from Felix L. Sparks, Director, Colorado [State] Water Conservation Board, to Ralph W. Johnson (Apr. 15, 1975). It is
estimated that if all the programs recommended by the Forum are implemented,
about 80% of the salinity reductions would be due to the federal program and
20% to non-federal actions.
28. Letter from Arthur E. Williamson, Administrator, Water Quality Division, Department of Environmental Quality, State of Wyoming, to Ralph W. Johnson (Apr. 29,
1975).

27.

29. Id.
30. Letter from Vernon E. Valentine, Assistant Chief Engineer, Colorado River Board
of California, to Ralph W. Johnson (May 7, 1975); Letter from Joseph C. Lord,
supra note 27.
31. Letter from Felix L. Sparks, supra note 27.
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"zoning, irrigation efficiency or other such controls ... would
be utterly impossible of enforcement and otherwise barren
of production results." Neither the plan, nor EPA, recommends placing emphasis on the permit system under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, for
controlling agricultural salinity sources,2 although it does
urge this system of control for industrial salinity. Instead, it
"proposes increased educational activity in an effort to promote irrigation methods which would decrease salt loading".33 Holburt describes it this way:
The major emphasis for salinity control from irrigation sources is on improving irrigation management
and on improving control of water flow in canals, laterals, and drainage systems. The ways that these will
be accomplished on existing irrigation projects are
through the Bureau of Reclamation's Irrigation Management Services (IMS) and Water Systems Improvement (WSI) Programs.
The IMS Program's objective is to increase onfarm irrigation water efficiency. Benefits projected to
be derived from the program include increased crop
yields, water savings, reduced leaching of salts, and reduced drainage requirements. It is anticipated that
these benefits to the farmers will exceed the costs to
the farmers. The IMS Program will be accomplished
mainly through an education program and will be on
a voluntary basis. Programs are currently under way
in the above mentioned irrigation projects.
Research is being carried out on the use of sprinkler and drip irrigation systems, with very low leaching
fractions to precipitate harmless salts in the soil profile. It is not clear at this time how expensive on-farm
improvements would be funded. Some financial assistance is anticipated through Federal programs such
as Rural Economic Assistance Programs.
The WSI Program involves changes or additions to
structures in water conveyance systems in order to reduce seepage into the ground and subsequent drainage and salinity pickup problems. The structural
32.

33.

At present, a practicable and effective technology for controlling salinity
in irrigation return flows cannot be defined. Consequently, the initial
NPDES permit program will be one which is designed to provide data
upon which informed judgments may be made as to the type of control
measures which should be taken.
COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL FORUM, PROPOSED WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR SALINITY INCLUDING NUMERIC CRITERIA AND PLAN OF
IMPLEMENTATION FOR SALINITY CONTROL: COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM (1975).
Letter from Joseph C. Lord, supra note 27.
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changes studied under this program includes lining of
canals and laterals, installation of field drainage systems. The measures should result in a reduction in
water losses from the irrigation system and into deep
percolation, thereby reducing water contact with high
saline soils, shales, and groundwater aquifers.
The results of studies recently conducted by Colorado State University for the Environmental Protection Agency in Grand Valley, Colorado, indicate that
a 50% reduction in return flow will result in 30% to
70% reduction in salt load in that portion of Grand
Valley .4
The plan, which covers the period 1974 through 1990,
does not include augmentation of the Colorado River from
any other river basin, although it does include some additional use of California State Project water in the South Coastal
Plain of Los Angeles in lieu of a portion of the Los Angeles
Metropolitan Water District's allocation of Colorado River
water, which would be used for power plant cooling in the
Colorado desert.
NATIONAL

AIMS AND SALINITY CONTROL

In considering these various solutions to the salinity problems of the Colorado, we must keep in mind the national
aims or goals that have traditionally provided guidance in
planning water projects, especially in the southwest. As described by the National Academy of Sciences,36 these aims
can generally be classified in five groups.
(1) national economic efficiency, i.e., bringing a net
increase in national wealth,
(2) income redistribution, e.g., limiting the availability
of water from federal projects to small (320 acre or
less) family farms; subsidizing the economic growth
of the southwest to assure it continues at about the
same rate as in the past; rescuing areas threatened
with floods such as Imperial Valley, or diminishing
water supplies such as Phoenix,
34.

Letter from Myron B. Holburt, Chief Engineer, Colorado River Board of California,
to Ralph W. Johnson (May 30, 1975).
35. Letter from Vernon E. Valentine, supra note 30.
36. NATIONAL ACADEMY SCIENCE, WATER AND CHOICE IN THE COLORADO BASIN
(1968).
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(3) political equity, e.g., expressing international
goodwill through the Mexican Treaty of 1944; meeting Indian water rights claims,
(4) controlling the natural environment, i.e., the view
that places a premium on technical proficiency in
regulating volume and quality and reflects the notion
that an uncontrolled resource is a wasted resource
and that if man has the capacity to control and completely utilize the waters of a river he should do so,
and
(5) environmental protection, preservation and esthetics, eg., the view that a free flowing river through
natural canyons may be of greater value than the
power and irrigation benefits resulting from reservoirs
partially filling those canyons.
In the context of these goals and aims we can see that the
ones which have dominated the Colorado salinity control
program are as follows:
It is clear that national economic efficiency has not been
the dominant, or even a highly important goal in the design
of the Colorado Basin salinity management program. This
goal has been subordinated to the twin goals of political equity and income redistribution as described below.
The income redistribution aspect of the recent salinity
control measures is apparent in the "rescue" approach. The
Colorado River water users are in an awkward position. Their
use of the waters of the river has produced a gradual but persistent increase in salinity (on top of a high natural salinity
level) projected to get worse in the future. They could, of
course, be required to take care of the problem themselves,
but instead have persuaded Congress to subsidize a substantial
part of the rescue operation through the use of federal funds
from general revenues. (In the same way that industrial and
municipal polluters have persuaded Congress to allocate massive subsidies to help clean up the nation's waters under the
1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments.)
The Colorado Basin states have also convinced Congress that
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977
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they are entitled to federal support to continue the past rate
''
of "expansion of the regional economy. a?
The aim of political equity is served through the agreement with Mexico to provide agriculturally usable quality water at the border, and the decision to spend federal dollars to
implement this through construction of the Wellton-Mohawk
drain extension and the Wellton-Mohawk desalination plant.
Similarly, the Basin states have been persuasive in arguing
that the allocation of water among the Basin states under
compacts, Supreme Court decisions, and federal laws should
be recognized and affirmed by the federal government and
that the national as well as regional objective should be "full
development of the water supply allocated to each state by
the applicable water laws and compacts." ' The Basin states
have also consistently supported international comity arguments to the effect that the obligation to provide Mexico
with usable quality water is a "national" obligation and should
not be the burden solely of the Basin states.
Analysis
The problem of excessive salinity ordinarily does not
arise until a river is already intensively appropriated for irrigation, power, industrial, and municipal uses. By that time facilities are in place, rights are established and investments
made. The problem ordinarily arises from the cumulative impact of many, many users. This makes solutions exceptionally
difficult. The optimal solution will generally be found by
considering the problem on a basin-wide basis. In fact the
solution should often reach beyond the basin, e.g., where water is exported from or imported into the basin.
In most cases the optimal solution is one that would result in the least total cost per unit of salinity reduction. (On
the Colorado the optimal solution is probably, more accurate37.
38.

EPA Report, supra note 10, at 57.
Id. The past, and continuing objective for the development of the basin's water resources should be "full development of the water supply allocated to each state by
applicable water laws and compacts." See also comments of Mr. A. E. Williamson,
former Director of Sanitary Enginering Services, Department of Health and Social
Service, Wyoming, who noted the "ground rules" for planning salinity control actions are (1) in no way would water quality standards or such ever be used to circumvent the allocation of waters as laid out in the Compact, and (2) "in no way
would we infringe on a state's right to use their allocated share of water"; Letter
from Arthur E. Williamson to Mr. R. L. O'Connell, Environmental Protection
Agency (June 1, 1971).
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ly, "the least total cost per unit of salinity reduction accompanied with the least loss of water from the system.") To
achieve an optimal solution is especially difficult when there
exists a multitude of public and private entities within the
basin, each with economic, legal, political and social investments in existing projects, facilities and waters, and where
any particular plan of implementation will fall unevenly.
At the very least the optimal solution requires extensive
voluntary cooperation among all water users. Realistically,
however, such voluntary cooperation can hardly be expected
to produce and implement an optimal plan.
In theory, what is needed is a basinwide, regional or larger entity with sufficient jurisdiction and power to (1) gather
the needed data, (2) design the optimal plan, and (3) implement the (or insist upon implementation of that) plan. Such an
entity should also have the capacity to arrive at, and implement a program of cost allocation for the actions taken. The
management entity should make a complete systems analysis
of the problem. It should be able to consider, and implement
if appropriate, the widest possible array of alternatives, and it
should provide opportunity for full discussion and revelation
concerning the allocation of costs.
It should, however, be remembered that this theoretically
neat decision structure may, in the real world, prove impractical, and come with too high a political cost to justify adoption. This appears to be true in the Colorado Basin. Nor will
it ordinarily be wise to simply add another layer of bureaucracy to an existing governmental structure for the purpose
of solving the salinity problem, for while salinity management
is important, it still is a lesser variable among many that must
be considered in determining the total management structure
for a given river. Nonetheless, the theoretical model offers
sufficient advantages to justify sighting on it as a goal as salinity management problems are approached.
One can expect the larger contributors to the salinity
problem will especially object to bearing the burden of cleanup in proportion to their contribution to the problem, on the
theory that when they made their water use investments the
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977
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rules of the game did not require salinity control, and they
should not be singled out to bear those costs now that the
rules are being changed.
One might argue, in theory at least, that no one has a
legal right to pollute, and that is the premise on which most
national pollution control programs are based, both in this
country and abroad.3 But the salinity problem is far more
complex than this statement implies, for it results from a
wide variety of causes, including out of basin diversions, structure, location and regulation of reservoirs, phraetophyte control, evaporation control, etc., 40 and is not produced simply
by agricultural uses of a river. Also, it is widely recognized,
and accepted in pollution abatement programs everywhere,
that financial assistance in the form of subsidies should be
available to help historic polluters through the period of transition to less polluting methods. This argument has been persuasive in the Colorado River Basin, and can be expected to
arise elsewhere.
The recommendations for a comprehensive basinwide or
regional management entity to plan and implement a salinity
control program for the Colorado Basin have, to date, produced, primarily, a voluntary, cooperative interstate discussion group, the "Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum." It must be noted, however, that in spite of the voluntary nature of this discussion group, it has been a dynamic
force in approaching the Colorado Basin salinity problem,
having established the plan of implementation, conducted
comprehensive computer and other studies and carried out
complex interstate and federal-state negotiations on salinity
issues. Public Law 93-320 has also been enacted, establishing
the basis for a basinwide program based on the Bureau of
Reclamation's 1972 report entitled "Colorado River Water
Quality Improvement Program". This Act provides for cooperation between the Secretaries of the Interior and Agricul39. JOHNSON & BROWN, CLEANING UP EUROPE'S WATERS: ECONOMICS, MANAGEMENT, POLICIES (1976).
40.

See, e.g., Pionke & Nicks. The Effect of Selected Hydrologic Variables on Stream
Salinity, XV BULL. INT'L ASS'N SCIENTIFIC HYDROLOGY, 4 (1970); Pionke &
Workman, Effect of Two Impoundments on the Salinity and Quantity of Stored
Waters, 10 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 66 (1974); Pionke, Nicks & Schoof, Estimating Salinity of Streams in the Southwestern United States, 8 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 1597 (1972); Pionke, Effect of Climate, Impoundments,
and Land Use on Stream Salinity, 25 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION, 62
(March-April 1970).
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ture and the EPA administrator. Public Law 93-320 also created the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Advisory Council to act as liaison between and among the federal agencies
and the states, and to make recommendations for appropriate
studies. It is only conjecture whether time, and the gradual
but predictable worsening of the salinity problem in the Basin
will necessitate the creation of an entity with more substantial legal powers of management.
In the meantime the management decisions lie in the
hands of the federal government. Fortunately, its legal powers
are broad enough to design and implement a wide range of
solutions if it has the political will to do so. The federal powers are found in the President's powers to make treaties 41 and
empowering Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, 42 administer public lands,4 protect the Native American, 4 4 and provide for the general welfare. 45 Congress can
override state laws if it wishes to do so and it has gradually
moved in, and has become the immediate supervisor, if not
actual implementer, of other pollution control programs
throughout the United States under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. It is not difficult to
predict that the federal government will gradually continue
to move into and assume ever-greater jurisdiction over the
Colorado salinity management problem, either through an
existing federal agency such as the EPA or the Department of
the Interior, or through the creation of a more strongly empowered basin or regional entity.
It is possible that some changes in the appropriation system in the West might marginally help to alleviate the salinity
problem. That system has seldom considered water use for
pollution control a beneficial use, has often denied legal rights
to instream uses of water, and has sometimes discouraged
efficiency in water transportation and irrigation. However, it
remains doubtful whether changes in the appropriate systems
- which would have to occur in each state - would have
more than a marginal impact on salinity levels in the river.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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Besides, any such changes could certainly not occur without
substantial political cost in view of the legal, economic, and
cultural attachment that western farmers have for the appropriation system.
In theory one might think of zoning or water use regulations as legal tools to be considered in a salinity management
program. Thus, it is conceivable that an area might be zoned,
or water users regulated, so that only certain crops could be
grown, only a limited quantity of water used for irrigation,
or irrigation carried out only at certain times. Such an approach may in the future become necessary as the salinity
problem worsens and as marginal remedies become more attractive. To date, however, these remedies have not been seriously tested and there is no firm evidence as to how effective
they would be if tried. They are, in any event, quickly rejected by Colorado Basin water users who have opted for other
solutions.
To date all irrigation efficiency and water use management programs have been voluntary and are based on education and persuasion rather than on legal regulation. And, indeed, most water managers and other experts in the Colorado
Basin believe the voluntary program will, in the long run, be
more effective. It is noteworthy, however, that a decision has
been made to reduce by 10,000 acres the amount of the
authorized irrigable acreage from the Wellton-Mohawk Project
and to make further reductions in the irrigable acreage as appropriate, with the consent of the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation
District. Also, several other planned, but unconstructed projects are being re-evaluated and may possibly be redesigned
(possibly with less land, or different land going under irrigation) in light of the goal of salinity control.
Salinity management poses complex challenges for legal
and institutional structures. In general, private law systems
will only partially be able to meet these challenges. While the
optimal solution, one that produces the largest reduction in
salinity for the least unit cost, may theoretically result from
the creation, or existence of a comprehensive basin or regional management entity with power to consider, plan, and implement the widest possible range of alternative solutions,
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss2/4
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real-world constraints, as on the Colorado and elsewhere will
often dictate otherwise. In view of the great complexity of
the problems, concerning physical causes of salinity, uncertain
legal rights, potential for protracted litigation, and the potential fallibility of new layers of bureaucracy, the best results
will often be attained by working through and redirecting the
priorities of existing institutions.
APPLICABILITY OF THE COLORADO BASIN
APPROACH TO OTHER RIVER BASINS

There is danger in too-easy generalization about the applicability of United States water management practices to
other countries. Water problems are everywhere unique, and
solutions must be designed in light of the prevailing geographic, hydrological, and agricultural situation, the political and
legal history, religious beliefs, and economic conditions.
Nonetheless, some of the lessons of the Colorado would seem
to have a bearing on salinity problems elsewhere.
Salinity problems cannot be solved in isolation. The optimal solution will only be found after an analysis of the entire hydrological, economic, political, agricultural system,
i.e., after a full systems analysis. A team studying salinity and
waterlogging in the Indus Valley concluded in 1962 that
these problems "must be attacked within the context of a
broad approach toward a large and rapid increase in agricultural productivity," and should be organized to "permit a coordinated attack on all aspects of the agricultural prob46
lems."
Solutions to salinity problems may require a wide range
of actions, including construction of drainage ditches, drilling
of wells, construction of desalination plants, taking land out
of irrigation, reducing or increasing the amount of water used
for irrigation, changing methods or timing of irrigation,
changing crops, construction or alteration of the design of
reservoirs, and changing the regulation of existing reservoirs.
And the list goes on, as illustrated elsewhere. 47 It must be remembered too that almost every action taken to resolve a
46.
47.

Baxter, The Indus Basin, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS
443-485 (Garretson, Hayton & Olmstead eds. 1967).
See SALINITY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RESOURCES (Yaron ed.) (forthcoming).
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salinity problem will 1) cost money, and 2) adversely impact
some existing activity.
Where does this leave us? The lesson to be learned, for
the United States or elsewhere, is that a systems analysis is
vital for achieving the optimal solution to salinity problems.
In the highly developed United States, with its strong economic system and educated populace, a substantially voluntary approach has achieved some success in the Colorado
Basin. Whether this approach will continue to be effective for
that Basin in the future, as the intensity of competition for
water increases, is not at all clear. What does seem clear, is
that in most places in the world such a voluntary program
will not work, at least not as effectively. A more likely approach is one where the central government, or one of its
agencies, will analyze the problem, consider and select among
the multiple alternative solutions, and implement those solutions by direct and authoritative governmental action. Varying legal and institutional formulae will be used depending on
the political situation in the particular country. The ultimate
goal, however, should be the same everywhere, that is to establish the legal-institutional machinery that has the authority
to consider, and implement, a comprehensive systems approach to the solution of the salinity problem.
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